Abstract
INTRODUCTION( * )
The global art market has experienced an extraordinary growth worldwide over the last years, recording an estimated Euro 45 billion worth of sales in 2005 and achieving a growth in sales of 95 percent in terms of value and 24 percent in terms of transaction numbers over the previous 5 years (McAndrew, 2008) .
At the origin of this growth is the vast global increase in art demand. Indeed, a new generation of buyers, both private and institutional, has come into the art market, attracted by the expected high returns and low correlations of art as investment.
As the art market becomes more important, the characteristics of art as investment have been extensively analyzed in the literature.
Most of the studies concern the development of art price indices and the evaluation of risk-return of art investment with respect to investment in traditional financial assets (Baumol, 1986; Goetzmann, 1993; Mei and Moses, 2002; Campbell, 2008) . While results differ according to the methodology, the time period, and the art portfolio considered, the general conclusion has been that art has low correlation with financial asset classes but provides a lower average risk-adjusted return. Other works investigate the use of art as collateral for loan contracts (McAndrew and Thomson, 2007) and propose new credit derivatives for hedging credit risk of art-backed loans (Campbell and Wiehenkamp, 2008) .
Another branch of art research focuses on the relationship between art prices and pre-sale estimates provided by auction houses together with other information on the artworks on sale contained in the catalogues published before each auction.
The rationale behind auction houses' estimates is to level the playing field between the wholesale and retail customers in the art market and attract individual collectors (Mei and Moses, 2005) .
According to Sotheby's an auction estimate is "a price that the auction house's specialists believe a piece might bring at auction". Given the nature of their profession, auctioneers seem to be in the best position to predict the best possible estimate of the expected hammer price and artwork pre-sale estimates could be useful reference points for any art valuation process and should drive operators' investment and divestment decisions. Moreover, since the price of each unique artwork is normally affected by inconstant and intangible factors, estimates are usually expressed as a range within which the experts forecast the final price will fall.
From the point of view of an investor, it is crucial to understand the predictability power of pre-sale estimates. This is particularly true for inexperienced (albeit wealthy) individual investors, who are likely to be subject to behavioral biases (Mei, Moses, and Xiong, 2004) .
This paper belongs to the second stream of research, since it aims at investigating the informational content of pre-sale estimates. We define the information content of estimates through two main dimensions: (1) the uncertainty and (2) the accuracy of estimates.
We consider the width of the estimate range as an indicator of the uncertainty in predicting sale prices (the greater the uncertainty, the wider the range). The prediction uncertainty may differ among auction houses, for instance because of their different policies in setting estimates or expertise in valuing artworks. The uncertainty may also depend on the specific attributes or the collecting category of the individual piece of art. Other elements may affect the auctioneer's confidence in setting estimates. Bidders' behaviours may be more predictable in some marketplaces/countries. Finally, further information on the artwork (e.g., the item price history) may reduce the auctioneer's prediction uncertainty.
Possible measures of the precision (accuracy) of pre-sale estimates include: (1) the frequency of times the hammer price falls into the pre-sale estimate range; (2) the distance between the hammer price and a punctual estimate of the hammer price itself, as indicated by the average between the low and high estimates. Furthermore, pre-sale estimates may turn out to be biased, when auction houses systematically either overvalue or undervalue hammer prices.
To our knowledge, we are the first to investigate the informational content of pre-sale estimates as defined above. The existing contributions from the relevant literature on auction prices only address particular aspects of the issue.
Most of the research on the informational efficiency of art auctions has been concerned with the biasedness of pre-sale estimates. In this respect, opinions differ widely. Ashenfelter (1989) In contrast, many authors have provided empirical evidence of the biasedness of pre-sale estimates. According to Beggs and Graddy (1997) , overvaluations and undervaluations occur frequently. In their paper, they find that more recently executed Contemporary and Impressionist & Modern artworks are commonly overvalued. According to Ekelund, Ressler, and Watson (1998) , estimates are biased. By studying the Latin American art market, they claim that auction houses tend to underestimate prices. McAndrew and Thompson (2004) , looking at French Impressionist paintings sold by a large number of international auction houses, show that there is a tendency to underestimate hammer prices when considering only sold items. However, estimates turn out to be unbiased when all items (including unsold works) are included in the analysis. Bauwens and Ginsburgh (2000) , by observing English silvery auctioned by Sotheby's and Christie's, show that estimates are slightly biased and that experts do not use all the information that is available to them when making their estimates. Czujack and Martins (2004) , on the basis of a data set of Picasso paintings sold at Christie's and Sotheby's, show that no significant differences exist between the two houses in predicting prices and that auction houses could not provide better estimates even using all available information. Sproule and Valsan (2006) reach similar conclusions using data from the sales of four abstract painters (Vassily Kandinsky, Juan Miro, Paul Klee, and Karel Appel): hedonic regressions do not seem to make pre-sale estimates more reliable. Finally, Mei and Moses (2005) , by analysing a large data set of paintings sold by Sotheby's and
Christie's at least twice, find that pre-sale estimates contain an upward bias for expensive paintings over a long period of thirty years.
Another question addressed by the literature on art auction prices is whether the width of the range affects the probability of sale. Ekelund, Ressler, and Watson (1998) try to understand whether a narrow range increases the probability of no-sale. According to the authors, if the range is narrow because of a high reserve price, the painting is likely to be overvalued. If buyers understand this, they might be less willing to bid for that particular painting. Results show that the "window" (i.e., the difference between the high and low estimates) is negatively and significantly related to the likelihood of no-sale. Ashenfelter, Graddy, and Stevens (2002) observe the opposite phenomenon, since a larger estimate range should involve a lower probability of sale.
Some works on art auction prices focus on price differences across auction houses and geographical markets. In this respect, Pesando (1993) tests the "law of one price" by comparing Modern print prices realized in the United States with those realized in London and Europe. Differences are striking, since prices are much higher in the United States than in either London or Europe. Furthermore, prices are higher in London than in the rest of Europe. Pesando also observes some differences among auction houses. He finds that prices are on average higher at Sotheby's than at Christie's in New York, while no significant differences exist between the same auction houses in London. Mei and Moses (2002) also analyse the law of one price. They show that return differences between the two major auction houses appear to be small. Although they provide some evidence that purchase prices are somewhat higher for Old Masters at Sotheby's, it appears that significant differences only exist between the two big auction houses and the minor ones. Higgs and Worthington (2006) provide the same evidence on the Australian market for Modern and
Contemporary art, where prices at both Sotheby's and Christie's seem to be on average higher if compared with prices fetched at minor auction houses.
Another aspect investigated by the literature on auction dynamics is whether anchoring effects exist. According to Beggs and Graddy (2007) , there is an anchoring effect for both sale prices and estimates, since the prices and the low estimates for second sales appear to be influenced by past prices. This may confirm that estimates are provided by auctioneers by using various sorts of information, including the prices fetched at previous auction sales.
In this paper we aim at answering three main questions: (1) Are the auctioneers good predictors of auction prices? (2) Which factors do affect estimate uncertainty? (3) Which factors do affect the accuracy in predicting auction prices?
To answer these questions, we employ a unique data set of Italian paintings which were sold by 15 auction houses all over the world at least twice over the period from 1985 to 2006.
Three main findings emerge from our analysis. First, pre-sale estimates are not good predictors of hammer prices. Second, the uncertainty and accuracy in price prediction decreases and increases, respectively, when Italian paintings are auctioned in Italy, thus revealing a "Country effect". Third, the informational content of estimates is affected by past prices, thus revealing some anchoring effect.
Our study complements the existing literature on art as investment and the relationship between auctioneers' estimates and prices along two main directions. First, in examining the pre-sale estimate predictability power, we consider both dimensions of informational content of auctioneers' estimates (i.e., uncertainty and accuracy). Second, we directly investigate a heterogeneous set of variables which might explain the differences in the informational content of the estimates provided by a large array of auction houses operating in different countries.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 presents the methodology of the empirical analysis; section 3 describes the data sources and summarizes the sample characteristics; section 4 presents the empirical results; section 5 concludes.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The empirical analysis aims at testing for any systematic differences in estimate uncertainty and accuracy.
Uncertainty in prediction
To examine which factors affect the uncertainty in predicting prices, the following regression model is estimated:
PRICERANGE is the ratio of the estimate range to the minimum of the pre-sale price range estimate, that is: (Maximum of the pre-sale price range -Minimum of the pre-sale price range) / Minimum of the pre-sale price range. We use this measure as a proxy for the auctioneer's prediction uncertainty, assuming that the auctioneer would increase the pre-sale estimate range as the hammer price becomes harder to predict.
Collecting Category is a set of dummy variables (D_CLASS, D_XIX_CENT, D_MODERN, D_CONT) which equal 1 if the painting belongs to the Classical, 19 th Century, Modern, and Contemporary collecting category, respectively, and zero otherwise( 1 ). We suspect that the value of paintings belonging to some collecting categories might be either easier or more difficult to predict. If so, by adding the Collecting Category dummy variables in the regression model, we should control for any differences in predicting hammer prices.
Auction House is a set of dummy variables (D_CHRISTIE'S, D_FINARTE, D_SOTHEBY'S, D_OTHAUCTION) which equal 1 if the painting is sold by Christie's, Finarte, Sotheby's or by any other auction house, respectively, zero otherwise ( 2 ). We use this set of variables to control for any differences in auction houses' confidence in predicting hammer prices. We expect that major auction houses may rely upon more expertise and a wider set of information on the artwork and/or the market (e.g., bidders' behaviors). If so, a negative coefficient sign of the D_CHRISTIE'S and D_SOTHEBY'S variables on PRICERANGE is expected.
D_ITALY is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the painting is sold in Italy and zero otherwise. We suspect that there is a comparative advantage for auction houses in the valuation process when the "nationality" of the artwork (e.g., Italian paintings) is the same as that of the auction house (e.g., Christie's located in Rome or Finarte in Milan). Such effect would suggest a negative coefficient sign on PRICERANGE.
Sale Characteristics variables include:
D_PREVSALE -a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is at least one previous sale for the painting in the sample and zero otherwise. The anchoring effect argument would suggest that the outcome of past auctions will provide additional information to experts. We assume that it is valuable to know if a piece of art was bought-in in a previous auction or was sold at a certain price. This sort of information will make it easier for an auctioneer to predict the hammer price. Since our sample include only sold items, we only consider the anchoring effect due to the existence of past prices, as captured by the D_PREVSALE variable. We expect a negative coefficient sign. 
Accuracy in prediction
To examine which factors affect the accuracy in predicting art prices, we conduct two alternative analyses. First, we estimate the following regression model:
where ABSDISTANCE is the absolute value of the ratio of the distance between the hammer price and the midpoint of the estimate range to the midpoint of the range. This variable is negatively correlated to the auction house's accuracy in predicting art prices. In fact, its minimum value, that is 0, would denote a perfect predictive ability.
In this analysis, the Sale Characteristics set of variables also includes the PRICERANGE variable. We assume that the greater the uncertainty, the lower the accuracy in predicting hammer prices. Therefore, we expect a positive coefficient sign for this variable in the ABSDISTANCE regression.
Moreover, we estimate the following logit regression model:
where D_ONTARGET is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the hammer price falls in the auction house's pre-sale estimate range and 0 otherwise.
DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
We use auction sales data of all Italian paintings which were sold at the salerooms of 15 auction houses all over the world at least twice from 1985 to 2006 (inclusive), as provided by the Gabrius database.
Our data set consists of 1,975 sales relating to 967 different paintings created by 457 different Italian artists. Each individual sale is considered as a unique point in our database.
In particular, we end up with a sample of 927 double sales, 39 triple sales and one quadruple sale. Paintings in our data set come from four different collecting categories (Classical, 19 th Century, Modern and Contemporary art).
Tables 1.a and 1.b show the number of sale observations for the major auction houses( 4 ), the four collecting categories, and the countries ( 5 ) where the sale took place. The proportion of hammer prices that fall below the minimum estimate is quite high (20% overall), even if our sample includes only paintings which reached the reserve price set by the seller. Table 3 shows sample descriptive statistics for both price (i.e., HAMMER) and estimation variables, including RANGEAVERAGE (i.e., the midpoint of the pre-sale price range), PRICERANGE, DISTANCE (i.e., the distance between the hammer price and the midpoint of the range, normalized by dividing it by the range midpoint), and ABSDDISTANCE.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Descriptive and univariate analysis
Again, statistics are provided for the entire sample and are also broken up into auction house, collecting category and country subsamples.
In Table 5 shows the OLS regression estimates of Equations (1) and (2). For each of these equations we run different OLS regressions. In the regressions in columns 1, 3, and 5 we test the anchoring effect by including the D_2 nd sale, D_3 rd sale, and D_4 th sale dummy variables, whereas in those in columns 2, 4, and 6 we use a single dummy variable (D_PREVSALE).
Regression analysis
As far as PRICERANGE regressions are concerned (columns 1 and 2), consistently with our expectations, we find that D_2 nd sale and D_3 rd sale (column 1) and D_PREVSALE (column 2) have a significant negative coefficient, denoting that the existence of a previous price makes the pre-sale estimate range narrower: in other words, it adds further information to the auctioneer, thus increasing his confidence in setting estimates.
The significant negative sign of the D_ITALY variable denotes that when an auction (of Italian collectibles) takes place in Italy, auctioneers are, on average, more confident in setting pre-sale estimates.
Auction houses behave differently, as proved by the significant coefficients of the D_SOTHEBY'S and D_CHRISTIE'S (positive) and D_FINARTE (negative) variables. On average, Sotheby's and Christie's set a wider pre-sale price range than Finarte.
The significant negative coefficient of the D_MODERN variable suggests that the auction houses' uncertainty in predicting painting prices increases when artworks belong to the Modern collecting category.
As far as ABSDISTANCE regressions are concerned (columns 3 to 6), we find that D_2 nd sale (columns 3 and 5) and D_PREVSALE (columns 4 and 6) have a significant negative coefficient, showing that the existence of a previous price makes the midpoint of the pre-sale estimate range closer to the actual hammer price. Moreover, the significant negative sign of the D_ITALY variable indicates that when an auction (of Italian collectibles) takes place in Italy, auctioneers set pre-sale estimates which are, on average, closer to hammer prices.
Thus, a "Country effect", or a "preferred habitat effect", would affect not only the confidence but also the accuracy of auction houses in predicting art prices. Table 6 shows the logit regression estimates of Equations (3). Again, we run two regressions. In the first one (column 1) we test the anchoring effect by including the D_2 nd sale and D_3 rd sale dummy variables, whereas in the second one (column 2) we use a single dummy variable (D_PREVSALE). The anchoring effect and the Country effect are still confirmed. Consistently with our expectations, the coefficient of the PRICERANGE variable is significantly positive, that is: the wider the PRICERANGE, the higher the probability that the hammer price will fall into the pre-sale estimate range.
CONCLUSIONS
Unlike financial assets, art assets are difficult to price. Thus, pre-sale estimates provided by auctioneers can be a useful informative tool for art market participants. This paper investigates the nature of the informational content of pre-sale estimates. We expected that uncertainty and accuracy of estimates might vary according to subjective (i.e., auctioneers' characteristics) and objective (i.e., artworks' features) differences as well as according to differences in the available information (e.g., the history of previous sales).
Descriptive analysis shows that pre-sale estimates are not good predictors of the realized prices, since the proportion of hammer prices falling within the pre-sale estimate range is only 37%. Nonetheless, such a small figure is similar to the results from other studies (e.g., Bauwens and Ginsburgh, 2000) and might be explained by the biasedness of pre-sale estimates.
Furthermore, our results show that, on the one hand, estimates provided by different auction houses exhibit different degrees of uncertainty. On the other hand, there is no evidence of any differences among auction houses in prediction accuracy. In addition, we find that the auctioneers' uncertainty and accuracy in price prediction decreases and increases, respectively, when Italian paintings are auctioned in Italy, no matter which auction house is considered. A sound knowledge of the Italian art market (e.g., investors' tastes and expense behavior) on the part of Italian-based auction houses rather than superior expertise in valuing Italian art may be a possible argument for this Country effect. Finally, the empirical evidence confirms the relevance of past prices in setting estimates, thus revealing some anchoring effect.
Our research has left some interesting issues. While we have provided further evidence of the poor reliability of pre-sale estimates in general, one may wonder what causes the differences in the informational content of estimates among different geographic markets and/or different auction houses. Explanatory factors might be found in the auctioneers' strategy in determining pricing as well as in technical and structural elements of art markets.
We will leave these for future research. (Maastricht University), for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
ENDNOTES
( 1 ) The D_CLASS dummy variable has been dropped to avoid collinearity in the data.
(
2 ) The D_OTHAUCTION dummy variable has been dropped to avoid collinearity in the data.
3 ) The D_1985 dummy variable has been dropped to avoid collinearity in the data. the ratio of the pre-sale estimate range to the low pre-sale estimate DISTANCE the ratio of the distance between the hammer price and the midpoint of the pre-sale price range to the range midpoint ABSDISTANCE the absolute value of the ratio of the distance between the hammer price and the midpoint of the presale price range to the range ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. th sale a dummy variable that equals 1 if there are three previous sales for the painting in the sample and zero otherwise D_PREVSALE a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is at least one previous sale for the painting in the sample and zero otherwise We also include year variables. We do not show these variable coefficients for ease of exposition. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. th sale a dummy variable that equals 1 if there are three previous sales for the painting in the sample and zero otherwise D_PREVSALE a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is at least one previous sale for the painting in the sample and zero otherwise We also include year variables. We do not show these variable coefficients for ease of exposition. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
